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Abstract
We examine the implications of worker heterogeneity on the equilibrium
matching process, using a directed search model. Worker abilities are se-
lected from a general distribution, subject to some weak regularity require-
ments, and the ﬁrms direct their job oﬀers to workers. We identify conditions
under which some fraction of the workforce will be "unemployable": no ﬁrm
will approach them even though they oﬀer positive surplus. For large mar-
kets we derive a simple closed form expression for the equilibrum matching
function. This function has constant returns to scale and two new terms,
which are functions of the underlying distribution of worker productivities:
the percentage of unemployable workers, and a measure of heterogeneity
(κ).The equilibrium unemployment rate is increasing in κ and, under cer-
tain circumstances, is increasing in the productivity of highly skilled workers,
despite endogenous entry. A key empirical prediction of the theory is that
κ ≥ 1. We examine this prediction, using data from several countries.
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11 Introduction
The distribution of worker productivities is a key factor in determining the
outcomes of the labor market, and macroeconomies more generally. In a general
sense, it is well known that this distribution can aﬀect the matching process, the
unemployment rate, the types of unemployment observed, and the distribution
of wages received by workers. To understand these relationships as clearly as
possible, though, a theory of the labor market is required which places worker
heterogeneity at the heart of the analysis, and which draws out the implications
of this heterogeneity as equilibrium phenomena.
Directed search theory is a natural candidate for this type of analysis because
rational selection across a variety of alternatives is its core feature. The location
choice, in directed search settings, is made by buyers, who choose across sellers.
The central insight of directed search was identiﬁed in Peters (1984): buyers, when
considering which seller to approach, trade oﬀ t w of a c t o r s—t h ep a y o ﬀ from the
good, and the probability of successful purchase. Thus, sellers that oﬀer higher
payoﬀs will typically attract more buyers and a lower probability, from the point
of view of buyers, of a successful purchase. When applied to the labor market,
the implications of this insight depend on which side of the market is interpreted
as buyer and seller. For example, Montgomery (1991), and Burdett, Shi, and
Wright (2001), modelled ﬁrms as sellers, and workers as buyers of jobs; whereas
Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) modelled the market the other way, with workers
interpreted as sellers, and ﬁrms as buyers, of labor. Thus, when focussing on the
implications of worker (rather than ﬁrm) heterogeneity, it is most natural to use
the latter approach, where ﬁr m sc h o o s ea c r o s sad i s t r i b u t i o no fw o r k e rt y p e s . 1
One of the more attractive features of directed search theories of the labor mar-
ket is that, in their simplest forms, they produce equilibrium matching processes
that have many of the characteristics of the matching functions that are com-
monly supported by empirical work: matches are increasing in vacancies and un-
employment, concave, and (with large markets) have constant returns to scale
(Julien, Kennes, and King (2000)). In models with homogeneous workers, of this
sort, however, this equilibrium matching process has no parameters in it — a fact
1In the simplest case with heterogeneous workers and homogeneous ﬁrms, if workers act as
buyers and choose which ﬁrms to approach, then heterogeneity plays no role at all in the matching
process. See Julien, Kennes, and King (2005) for further details.
2that weakens its performance empirically, relative to, for example, Cobb-Douglas
matching functions (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). Directed search models
do exist now that have parameters in the implied equilibrium matching processes
(see, for example, Albrecht et al (2004), where the number of applications plays
this role), and worker heterogeneity can play a role here, at least in principle 2
In this paper, we examine the implications of worker heterogeneity using a
directed search model based on Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), but with a non-
degenerate distribution of worker productivities. We characterize the unique sym-
metric mixed strategy equilibrium of this model, under diﬀerent of assumptions
about the nature of the distribution of worker types. We start with the simplest
case: binomial distributions. We then go on to consider arbirtrary distributions
with continuous supports. In both cases, we characterize the nature of the equi-
librium and draw out comparative static properties, as the underlying distribution
of worker types changes. We also provide simple closed form solutions for the
equilibrium matching process, in both cases, where the matching process is a func-
tion of statistics from the underlying distribution of worker productivities. The
performance of this matching process is then assessed, using data from the United
States and other countries.
We ﬁnd that, for each diﬀerent distribution of worker types, we can identify two
diﬀerent classes of workers: those who will be approached with positive probability,
and those who will not. Thus, we identify the set of "unemployable" workers: those
who will never be approached by ﬁrms, even though they have positive surplus.
The intuition for their existence, in equilibrium, follows directly from the central
insight of directed search, mentioned above. When ﬁrms choose which workers
to approach, they are inﬂuenced not only by the potential productivity a worker
oﬀers, but also by the probability of being able to hire the worker — the expected
payoﬀ in equilibrium. With arbitrary distributions of worker types, in principle,
one can identify cut-oﬀ values of worker types (at the lower end) where ﬁrms would
prefer to take a chance on being able to hire more productive workers, even if they
2Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) suggest a variety of ways in which parameters could be in-
troduced into urn-ball matching functions, which are the mathematical form that many equilib-
rium matching processes in directed search models take. Although their analysis is not, strictly
speaking, directed search, it is very suggestive about the eﬀects of heterogeneity in directed
search. See, also, Stevens (2007), for an alternative approach to providing microfoundations for
the matching function.
3could hire the lower productivity ones with probability one. Thus, the presence
of high productivity workers introduces the possibility that some low productivity
workers will simply never be oﬀered jobs. Moreover, increasing the productivity
of the best workers may, ceteris paribus, increase the fraction of workers at the
lower end that are unemployable in equilibrium and increase the unemployment
rate more generally.
We also identify three conceptually distinct eﬀects that heterogeneity has on the
equilibrium matching in the model. The ﬁrst is the decreased employability eﬀect,
which arises due to the potential existence of unemployables introduced by hetero-
geneity. The second is the increased miscoordination eﬀect. Minimization of the
unemployment rate requires that each ﬁrm assign equal probability to approach-
ing each worker. This occurs in the equilibrium with homogeneous workers, but
not with heterogeneous ones, where more productive workers are assigned higher
probabilities (However, the equilibrium we consider here is constrained-eﬃcient
in the sense that it maximizes expected total surplus.) The third eﬀect is the
decreased eﬀective labor force eﬀect: the probability of being employed is higher
for those workers who fall into the category of being "employable", with hetero-
geneity. However, we show that, overall, heterogeneity increases the equilibrium
unemployment rate.
The implied matching function has two terms in it that are functions of the
underlying distribution of worker productivities. The ﬁrst is the fraction of the
workforce that is unemployable, q, and the second is a measure of heterogeneity, κ,
that we construct. This second measure, according to the theory, must be weakly
greater than one (the lower bound, with homogeneous workers). We examine
whether or not this holds true in the data by considering two diﬀerent empirical
exercises. In the ﬁrst exercise, we treat κ as a variable and use the matching
function to generate a series {κt}. In the second exercise, we treat κ as a parameter
and estimate its implied value by estimating the matching function in the way that
is standard in the literature. The ﬁrst method provides unambiguous support for
the theory, while the second provides mixed support.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model with ﬁnite numbers of agents. In Section 3, we consider the case with
arbitrarily large numbers of workers and ﬁrms, both with a ﬁxed ratio of the two
and with endogenous entry and derive most of the theoretical results. Section
44i d e n t i ﬁes constrained eﬃcient allocations in the model. Section 5 presents the
empirical results. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 The Model with Finite Numbers of Agents
Consider a model where M ∈ N homogenous vacancies choose across N ∈ N
heterogenous workers, and where each worker i =1 ,2,...,N has productivity yi
and y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yN > 0. Assume that ﬁrms choose whether to approach a
particular worker after observing the vector of workers productivities.3 Assume,
further, that each ﬁrm has only one vacancy and can approach only one worker to
ﬁll it. If a ﬁrm is alone when it approaches worker i it makes a take it or leave it
oﬀer to the worker and captures all the surplus from the relationship. If several
ﬁrms approach the same worker they Bertrand compete for her services. In this
c a s e ,t h ew o r k e r ’ sw a g ew i l lb ee q u a lt oh e rp r o d u c t i v i t ya n dt h eﬁrm will capture
zero surplus.4
In a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium worker i is visited with the
same probability πi by all ﬁrms. For a ﬁrm, in this equilibrium, the expected payoﬀ
from visiting worker i is therefore the probability of being alone when approaching
that worker, multiplied by the worker’s productivity: (1−πi)M−1yi. If both workers
3Thus, as in Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), this is a model with multiple job applications,
where each worker applies to all ﬁrms, and ﬁrms can perfectly observe each worker’s productivity
level. See Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2006), Galenianos and Kircher (2009), and Kircher
(2009) for analyses of models where workers apply only to a fraction of ﬁrms.
4Julien, Kennes, and King (2006)) show that this wage determination mechanism is equivalent
to the "Mortensen rule" (Mortensen (1982)), and can be thought of as the outcome of an auction
through which workers sell their labor, and where they set their reserve wage equal to their
outside option. In this static game, the outside option is normalized to zero. Julien, Kennes,
and King (2000) show that the Nash equilibrium reserve wage converges to the outside option
as the market becomes large.
We chose this mechanism because of its simplicity: the value of the wage rate is easy to ﬁnd
(either zero or y). However, due to the starkness of the induced wage distribution, this may lead
one to question the realism of this distribution . A sac h e c k ,w ea l s oc o n s i d e r e da na l t e r n a t i v e
mechanism: generalized Nash bargaining, where, after ﬁrms were assigned to workers, each
worker (with multiple ﬁrms assigned) bargains sequentially with the assigned ﬁrms. This leads
to a more realistic wage distribution (see Camera and Selcuk (2009) for a discussion of similar
mechanisms) but is signiﬁcantly more cumbersome to work with. In this paper, the emphasis is
more on the properties of the equilibrium matching process than on the wage distribution per
se. In large markets (the focus of the analysis in this paper) the matching processes for the two
diﬀerent wage determination mechanisms converge. Details of the comparison are available upon
request.
5i and j are visited with positive probabilities in the equilibrium then the ﬁrms
should earn the same expected payoﬀ from visiting the workers, i.e.
(1 − πi)
M−1yi =( 1− πj)
M−1yj. (1)
Equation (1) implies that in equilibrium more productive workers are visited with
higher probabilities. Therefore, in general, there exists a number K ≤ N such that
πi > 0 for i =1 ,...,K and πi =0for i>K . That is, all workers i = K +1,...,N
are unemployable in the sense that all ﬁrms assign zero probability to visiting them,
even though they have positive surplus associated with them. All other workers
i =1 ,...,K are employable but, at the end of the day, will be either employed
or unemployed according to the visit probabilities πi. In general, for worker i,t h e
probability of being unemployed is (1 − πi)M.
The values of the equilibrium probabilities πi can be found through the follow-
ing algorithm.

















Step 2. If πK > 0 then (3) gives the equilibrium probabilities. Otherwise set
πK =0 ,a n dK = N − 1 and go to step 1.














> 0, for i = 1,2,j6= i. (4)
In particular, formula (4) implies that in any equilibrium at least two workers
are visited. Indeed, if all ﬁrms visit only the most productive worker, they are
6guaranteed to earn zero payoﬀs, while the deviator will earn payoﬀ y2. Therefore,
all the ﬁrms visiting the same worker cannot be the equilibrium. Therefore, we
have arrived at the following proposition.
Proposition 1 T h em a t c h i n gg a m ew i t hﬁnite numbers of players possesses a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which the K most productive workers are
visited with positive probabilities, while the (N − K) least productive workers are
visited with probability zero. The number K satisﬁes 2 ≤ K ≤ N and can be found
together with matching probabilities if one follows steps 1 and 2 described above.




[1 − (1 − πi)
M]. (5)
where the probabilities πi are determined by the algorithm given above. This
formula for the matching function holds true for any distribution of worker pro-
ductivies, and any ﬁnite numbers of workers and ﬁrms. While this formula is
useful for some purposes, it is not particularly amenable either to comparative
static analysis of the eﬀects of heterogeneity, or to econometric estimation. To
ﬁnd formulas that are more useful for these purposes, we will examine equilibria
in limit large economies.
Before doing so, though, it is useful to identify the equilibrium entry condition.
Given a ﬁxed cost of entry k>0, entry will occur up to the point where
(1 − πi)
M−1yi =( 1− πj)
M−1yj = k (6)
for all i in which πi > 0,a sd e t e r m i n e db yt h ea b o v ea l g o r i t h m .
3 The Model with Large Numbers of Agents
In this section, we analyze equilibrium allocations in the economy in the limit-
ing case when M,N →∞in such a way that their ratio φ = M/N remains ﬁxed,
and characterize the equilibrium matching process as a function of the underly-
ing distribution of worker productivities. To do so, it is instructive to consider
7diﬀerent cases, with increasing degrees of generality. We start with the simplest
possible case, where there are only two possible values of y.
3.1 Binomial Productivity Distributions
Suppose that productivities of workers come from a binomial distribution over
{yH,y L} with yH ≥ yL > 0 and Pr(y = yH)=p.W e ﬁrst prove that, given
any ﬁxed number M of vacancies, if there are suﬃciently many high productivity
workers in a symmetric equilibrium, low productivity workers are visited with zero
probability. Let q denote the fraction of the workforce that is employable. There
are, therefore, two cases to consider: q = p when only high productivity workers
are employable, and q =1when all are.
Let NL and NH be the number of low productivity and high productivity
workers, respectively, in the sample. Hence, from the algorithm given above, the
probability that a low productivity worker is visited is
πL =m a x ( 0 ,






1 − (yL/yH)1/(M−1) (8)
then πL =0 .












and, noting that φ = M/N , one obtains, after some rearrangement, that, asymp-





In particular, if competition for workers is strong, i.e.
φ>pln(yH/yL) (11)
8then q =1and all workers are approached at the equilibrium.5
We consider each case in turn. Assume, ﬁrst, that condition (10) holds, so that
q = p and all low productivity workers are unemployable. The expected number




[1 − (1 − πH)
M]. (12)











This matching function is a straightforward generalization of the urn-ball matching
function discussed in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), and derived in directed
search models with homogeneous populations in Julien, Kennes, and King (2000)
and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001). Indeed, with a homogenous population
(p =1 ), one obtains the familiar function: ξ(1,φ)=( 1− exp(−φ)) Notice that
the more general matching function ((14), preserves the key properties of the
function in the homogeneous case. In particular, in levels, it has constant returns
to scale in M and N. We can also see, very clearly, the eﬀects of heterogeneity on
the number of matches. First, notice that the matching rate is independent of the
values of yL and yH, it depends only on the relative numbers of each type of agent,
summarized in the value of p. With heterogeneity, p<1, and has two eﬀects on
the probability of employment. Low productivity workers become unemployable
and are not visited at all in equilibrium, however the probability of employment
conditional on being a high type, 1−exp(−
φ
p), increases relative to the case with a
homogenous population. The total eﬀect of heterogeneity is, however, to decrease
5The same result can be obtained by assuming that every ﬁrm approaches each high produc-
tivity worker with probability πH =1 /NH and requiring that it is unproﬁtable to deviate and
approach a low productivity worker, i.e. that (1 − 1/NH)











and, therefore, ξ(p,φ) is maximized at p =1 .
Now let us consider the other case, where condition (8) , for a ﬁxed population
or (10) for the inﬁnite population does not hold. In this case, q =1and both
types of workers are approached with positive probabilities in the equilibrium.
The visitation probabilities are given by:
πL =




NL(yH/yL)1/(M−1) − (NL − 1)
NL(yH/yL)1/(M−1) + NH
. (17)





































The matching rate, in this case, is:
ξ(φ,κ)=1− κexp(−φ). (21)
Thus, as before, the matching function has constant returns to scale in M and
N but, in this case, is not independent of the values of yL and yH. The value of
κ depends on the relative value yL/yH, and the proportion of workers with high
productivity: p.I ti se a s yt os h o wt h a t ,f o ra n yv a l u eo fp, κ is minimized where
yL/yH =1 , that is, in the homogeneous case — in which case, κ =1 , and we recover
10the homogeneous matching rate as the special case:
ξ(0,φ;yH,y L)=ξ(1,φ;yH,y L)=ξ(p,φ;y,y)=1− exp(−φ). (22)
The function κ is a measure of the heterogeneity of the underlying distribution
of worker productivities, and is strictly increasing in the distance between yL and
yH. Thus, it is clear from (21) that heterogeneity reduces the matching rate in
equilibrium.
3.1.1 Vacancy Entry
We now consider the properties of the equilibrium when vacancies can enter
by paying a ﬁxed cost k>0. Once again, there are two cases to consider: when
some workers are unemployable (q = p) and when not (q =1 )W es t a r tw i t ht h e
ﬁrst case.
Entry with Unemployable Workers .
Here, from (6), we have:
(1 − πH)
M−1yH = k (23)
where πH =1 /NH. In the large market, this becomes:
yH exp(−φ/p)=k (24)
Solving this equation for the tightness ratio φ,w eg e t :
φ = p(lnyH − lnk) (25)
Now, recall condition (10), which must hold when low productivity workers are
unemployable. Re-rewriting this condition, we have:
φ ≤ p(lnyH − lnyL) (26)
T h ea b o v et w oc o n d i t i o n si m p l yt h ef o l l o w i n g :
yL ≤ k (27)
11This tells us that low productivity workers will be unemployable if and only
their productivity level is below the cost of vacancy creation. We summarize this
result in a proposition.
Proposition 2 In the binomial model with entry, a worker is employable if and
only if y>k .
Let us now consider, then, the case where all workers are employable; that is,
when q =1 .
Entry without Unemployable Workers .
In this case, the entry condition (6) becomes:
(1 − πL)
M−1yL =( 1− πH)
M−1yH = k (28)
















In the limit, this becomes
yH exp[−φ − (1 − p)ln(yH/yL)] = k (30)
Solving for φ,w eg e t :
φ = p(lnyH − lnyL)+( l nyL − lnk) (31)
Lemma 1 In the binomial model with entry, if all workers are employable then,
in equilibrium, ∂φ/∂p > 0,∂ φ / ∂ y H > 0,∂ φ / ∂ y L > 0,∂ φ / ∂ k<0.
Proof. This follows directly from (31).
3.1.2 The Equilibrium Unemployment Rate
In general, the equilibrium unemployment rate is given by 1 − ξ. The value of
ξ depends on whether or not low productivity workers are unemployable.
12When Low Productivity Workers are Unemployable In this case, q = p
and the matching rate ξ is given in (14). In this case, the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate is:
U =1− p + pexp(−φ) (32)
where φ is given in (25). Making the substitution, we have:






Clearly, from (33), the unemployment rate has two components in this case.
The ﬁrst component, 1−p, captures the fraction of workers who are unemployable.
The second term captures those who are employable (in the sense that each ﬁrm
assigns positive probability to approaching them), but unemployed due to the
fact that, ex post, they were not approached by any ﬁrms. Note that, in the
homogeneous case, when p =1 ,t h e nU = k/yH, as is standard.
Proposition 3 In the binomial model, if low productivity workers are unemploy-
able (q = p) then equilibrium unemployment is increasing in k and decreasing in
yH and p.
Proof. Follows directly from (33).
The eﬀects of increases in k and yH on unemployment are entirely straight-
forward. Increases in the entry cost k reduces proﬁtability, entry, and, thus, in-
creases unemployment. Increases in productivity yH have precisely the opposite
eﬀect. Increases in p have two eﬀects: they reduce the fraction of the workforce
that is unemployable (driving down unemployment), but increase the fraction that
are subject to the possibility of coordination unemployment. Since unemployable
workers are unemployed with probability one, and employable workers are unem-
ployed with probability less than one, the overall eﬀect is negative.
When Low Productivity Workers are Employable In this case, q =1 ,a n d
the matching rate is given in (21). In this case, the equilibrium unemployment
rate is:
U = κexp(−φ) (34)
13Where κ = κ(yH,y L,p) is given in (20) and φ = φ(yH,y L,p,k) i sg i v e ni n( 3 1 ) .
Proposition 4 In the binomial model, if low productivity workers are employable
(q =1 ) then equilibrium unemployment is increasing in k,d e c r e a s i n gi nyL and
p.T h e e ﬀect of yH on unemployment depends on the value of yH/yL.W h e n
yH ≈ yL, unemployment is decreasing in yH. Beyond a critical point of yH/yL,
unemployment is increasing in yH.













































− 1) − κ) (38)
It is straightforward to show that ∂ lnU/∂yH < 0 when yH ≈ yL. Also, this
derivative changes sign when yH/yL crosses the value ζ, where ζ is determined as




These results are quite intuitive. The eﬀects of increasing vacancy costs, k,a r e
entirely straightforward. They do not aﬀect heterogeneity (κ) but simply reduce
the proﬁts of entry, thus reducing entry, and thereby increasing unemployment, as
i nt h ep r e v i o u sc a s e .I n c r e a s e si nt h eo u t p u to fl o wp r o d u c t i v i t yw o r k e r syL have
two eﬀects, both of which work in the same direction on unemployment. The ﬁrst
is to increase average productivity, thus encouraging entry and reducing unemploy-
ment. Secondly, increases in yL compress the distribution of worker productivities,
reducing the measure of heterogeneity, κ, and thereby increasing the eﬃciency of
the matching process and reducing unemployment. Increases in the fraction of
workers with high productivity, p,a l s oh a st w oe ﬀects. The ﬁrst, again, increases
14average productivity (thereby inducing further entry and reducing unemployment).
The second aﬀects the degree of heterogeneity (κ). It is straightforward to show
that the function κ(p) is inverse U-shaped, with minimum values of 1 at p =0and
p =1 . However, the overall eﬀect of any increase in p on unemployment is always
negative.
Increases in the output of high productivity workers yH also have two eﬀects on
unemployment. As with increases in y, these increase average worker productivity,
and induce entry. However, when yH increases, it spreads the distribution of
productivity, and increases κ, reducing the eﬃciency of matching. These two
eﬀects move in opposite directions. When heterogeneity is small, the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates, and unemployment is decreasing in yH. However, as heterogeneity
increases, the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst, and further increases in yH actually
increase unemployment.
We now turn to consider more general skill distributions, where productivities
are sampled from an arbitrary distribution with c.d.f. F(·). Since the set of
piecewise constant distribution functions, which correspond to random variables
with ﬁnite support, is everywhere dense in the set of all distribution cases, we will
start with considering the case when the productivity can take only a ﬁnite set
of values {y1,...,yI} with Pr(y = yi)=pi a n dt h e ng e n e r a l i z et ot h ec a s eo ft h e
arbitrary distribution.
3.2 Distributions with Finite Supports
Consider the case when the set of all possible productivities is ﬁnite. Without






























Nj +1> 0, (42)
















Nj +1 . (43)

















In general there exists a critical productivity y∗ such that workers are approached
with positive probability if yi ≥ y∗ and are not approached otherwise. We will
determine this productivity shortly. Given y∗ for the large population, the fraction















E(lny|y ≥ yK) − lnyi
φ
), (46)
provided yi >y K and πi =0otherwise.
16The critical productivity y∗ is determined by:
φ
1 − F(y∗)
= E(lny|y ≥ y
∗) − lny
∗. (47)
Example Let us calculate y∗ for the binary productivity model above. First,
assume that y∗ ∈ (yL,y H), i.e. low productivity workers are not approached in
equilibrium. Then 1 − F(y∗)=p and
φ
p
=l nyH − lny
∗ ⇔ y




Note that y∗ ∈ (yL,y H) if and only if condition (10) holds. Otherwise, y∗ ≤ yL,
which implies 1 − F(y∗)=1 . Adding 0=l nyL − lnyL to the right hand side of
equation (47) and rearranging one obtains
lny




which is consistent with the assumption that y∗ ≤ yL.
3.3 Distributions with Continuous Supports
It is easy to see that formulae (46) and (47) continue to hold if the productivities
are selected from an arbitrary distribution F(·) with support [y,y], where ∞ >















En(lny|y ≥ yKn) − lnyi
φ
), (51)
provided yi >y Kn and πi =0otherwise. In the case of an absolutely continuous
distribution with compact support , the diﬀerence between yKn and y∗
n disappears
17in the limit of a large population and the critical productivity y∗









Here En denotes expectation calculated using Fn(·). Taking the limit as n →∞
one obtains (46) and (47), where expectations are calculated using F(·).




























+ E(lny|y ≥ y







Passing to the probability limit one obtains








+ E(lny|y ≥ y
∗)), (55)
where, as before, y∗ is deﬁned as solution to the equation
φ
1 − F(y∗)
= E(lny|y ≥ y
∗) − lny
∗, (56)
provided it is greater than y and y∗ = y otherwise.6
Using equation (56) one can write (55) in a form








ξ ≥ 0. (58)
6It is straightforward to check that, for the case of binary distribution above, formulae (55)-
(56) reduce to (14) if condition (10) is satisﬁed and (21) otherwise.
18It is useful to introduce, again, the notation q for the fraction of workers who are










Then the matching rate can be expressed as:




Notice that this matching function, once again, has constant returns to scale in
M and N, and collapses down to the familiar function for homogeneous workers.
In this case, q = κ =1 . Outside of this special case, to be able to assess the eﬀects
of heterogeneity, we must ﬁrst assess the magnitude of κ in the general case.
Proposition 5 For any distribution of skills, κ ≥ 1.




,u 2 =l ny, (62)
respectively. Both utility functions belong to CRRA class with coeﬃcients of
relative risk aversion:
r(u1)=2 ,r (u2)=1 , (63)
therefore the ﬁrst individual is more risk averse than the second. This implies that
for any lottery L
CE(u1,L) ≤ CE(u2,L), (64)
where CE(u,L) denotes the certainty equivalent of lottery L for the individual with
Bernoulli utility function u(·). Moreover equality is obtained if and only if lottery
L is degenerate (see, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, Ch.6). Consider
the following lottery L∗:d r a wv a l u ey from distribution F(·), if y ≥ y∗ pay the




19Using the deﬁnition of certainty equivalent:
Eu(L)=u(CE(u,L)) (66)





where the last inequality follows from (64). Moreover, κ =1if and only if all the
population of employable workers is homogeneous.
Using this Proposition and (58) one can obtain the following bounds for the
matching function:
0 ≤ ξ ≤ q(1 − exp(−
φ
q
)) ≤ 1 − exp(−φ), (68)
where the second inequality holds as equality if and only if all the population of
employable workers is homogeneous.
Formula (61) allows us to identify three eﬀects of heterogeneity on the match-
ing function in general. The decreased employability eﬀect signiﬁed by the term q
in front of the brackets works to depress total employment, due to the fact that
some workers are now not approached at all. The increased miscoordination eﬀect,
signiﬁed by parameter κ, tends to depress employment due to the fact that all
ﬁrms are more likely to approach the most productive workers. This eﬀect tends
to decrease probability of employment conditional on the worker been employable.
Finally, the decreased eﬀective labor force eﬀect signiﬁed by q in the denominator of
the exponential factor works to increase the conditional probability of employment
conditional on being employable. As we argued above, the net eﬀect of hetero-
geneity on the total matching probability is negative. The eﬀect of heterogeneity





is, however, ambiguous. It becomes unambiguously positive if κ =1 , i.e. if all the
population of employable workers is homogeneous, and unambiguously negative if
20q =1 , i.e. the entire population is employable.
For the binary distribution of skills considered above, κ =1 ,q= p if (10) is





Finally, one can extend results of this Section to distributions with unbounded
support, since any distribution with unbounded support can be represented as a
limit of distributions with compact support.
3.3.1 Vacancy Entry
We now consider the properties of the equilibrium when vacancies can enter,
with cost k>0.
Proposition 6 With entry, y∗ = k.
Proof. With ﬁnite numbers of workers,for any worker i, entry continues until
proﬁts are driven to zero:
(1 − πi (yi))









E(lny|y ≥ y∗) − lnyi
φ
) (71)








E(lny|y ≥ y∗) − lnyi
φ
¶¶
yi = k (72)
This implies:
exp(−φ/q)exp(E(lny|y ≥ y
∗)) = k (73)
Taking logarithms of both sides:
−φ/q +( E(lny|y ≥ y
∗)) = lnk (74)
Rearranging, and recalling that q =1− F(y∗), we have:
φ
1 − F(y∗)
=( E(lny|y ≥ y
∗)) − lnk (75)
21If k ≥ y then k is a feasible value of y∗. Comparing (75) with the deﬁnition of
y∗ given in (56), we have: y∗ = k.
If, alternatively, k ≤ y. then k is not a feasible value of y∗. In this case, y∗ hits
the lower bound y.
3.3.2 The Equilibrium Unemployment Rate
As before, the equilibrium unemployment rate is given by U =1−ξ.M a k i n g
the substitution from (61), and rearranging slightly, we have:
U =1− q + qκexp(−φ/q) (76)
where q, κ, and φ are given in (59), (60), and (56), respectively.
With entry, since k ≥ y, from Proposition 6, we know that y∗ = k .T h e s e
three equations then become:




|y ≥ k)exp(E(lny|y ≥ k)). (78)
φ =( 1− F(k))[E (lny|y ≥ k) − lnk] (79)
Thus, the unemployment rate is purely a function of the cost of entry, k,a n d
the distribution of worker productivities F(·). Examining (76) we can see that, as
before, there are two qualitatively diﬀerent types of unemployment in this model.
The ﬁrst term (1−q) represents the fraction of the workforce that is unemployable.
(Notice that this is increasing in k.) The second term (qκexp(−φ/q)) represents
t h ef r a c t i o no ft h ew o r k f o r c et h a ti se m p l o y a b l e( q) but not employed ex post, due
to the stochastic nature of the matching process. The size of this term depends
not only on the size of q, but also on market tightness (φ)a n dt h em e a s u r eo f
heterogeneity (κ), all of which are functions of k and F(·).




|y ≥ k)k (80)



























dy > 0, (82)
Which proves the proposition.
The total eﬀect of increases in k on unemployment is unambiguous, although
expression (82) contains terms with diﬀerent signs. Intuitively, an increase in k
reduces the entry of vacancies in the usual way, increasing unemployment. How-
ever, when y∗ = k,a ni n c r e a s ei nk will increase y∗.T h i sh a st w oe ﬀects. First,
it increases the fraction of workers that are unemployable (thus increasing unem-
ployment); second, it reduces the heterogeneity among those who are employable
—p u s h i n gd o w nt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ef o rt h o s ew o r k e r s .O v e r a l l ,h o w e v e r ,t h e
ﬁrst two eﬀects dominate the third.
Our next objective is to investigate how the equilibrium unemployment reacts
to increase in risk. First, we must provide an appropriate deﬁnition of increase in
risk for this environment.7
Deﬁnition 1 Let w and z be random variables with non-negative support. We say
that z is obtained from w by a radial increase in risk if there exists a variable
ε such that w and ε and independent and
z = wε (83)
Note that deﬁnition of ε implies that it has non-negative support. To get some
intuition concerning the above deﬁnition it is useful to re-write formula (83) in
7We are grateful to John Quiggin for suggesting the appropriate deﬁnition of the “more risky”
for this environment.
23logarithms, i.e.
logz =l o gw +l o gε. (84)
Formula (84) shows that logz is obtained from logw by combination of a shift and
a mean-preserving spread in risk.8 Two cases are of a particular interest. If
E(logε)=0 (85)
then logz is obtained by a mean preserving spread in risk from logw.S i n c e b y
Jensen’s inequality
E(logε) ≤ log(Eε), (86)
where equality holds if and only if the distribution of ε is degenerate, in that
case Ez ≤ Ew. Another interesting special case is that of mean preserving radial
increase in risk, i.e. the case when Eε =1 . In that case
E(logz) ≤ E(logw). (87)
The term “increase in risk” is justiﬁed by observation that





which implies that for a mean preserving radial increase in risk
Va r(z) ≥ Va r(w). (90)
Below we will also assume y =0and y =0 . Now we a ready to formulate our next
proposition.
Proposition 8 Let the random variable y denote distribution of workers skills and
the random variable z be obtained from y by a non-degenerate radial increase in
risk, i.e. z satisﬁes (83) for some random non-degenerate variable ε.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
8Note that if y and ε and independent, so are logy and logε.
24assume both random variables y and z have probability densities and the following
expectations: E(1
y),E (lny),E (1
ε),E (lnε) are ﬁnite. Then there exists k∗ > 0 such
that for any k<k ∗ radial increase in risk will lead to increase in miscoordination,
i.e. increase in κ.
Proof. Let F(·) be the cdf of random variable y and H(·) be the of random
variable z.W ew i l lp r o v et h a t
κ(H) ≥ κ(F), (91)





for any arbitrary distribution Q and




First, consider the case k =0 .10 Let f(·) be the probability density of y and g(·)























9We the dependence of κ on the distribution explicit, below.
10Though this case is not interesting by itself, since k =0implies φ = ∞ and ξ =1 , i.e. full
employment, κ is still formally well deﬁned. By continuity argument, we will be able to extend
our result for the economically interesting case of small but positive entry costs.







lntg(t)dt =l nCE(u1,F)+lnCE(u1,G), (96)
which implies
CE(u1,H)=CE(u1,F) ∗ CE(u1,G). (97)
Similar logic implies
CE(u2,H)=CE(u2,F) ∗ CE(u2,G) (98)
and therefore






T h ea b o v ea r g u m e n ti m p l i e st h a t
κ(H) >κ (F) (101)
for k =0 . Since equation (64) implies that κ(Q) is continuous in k for any random
variable that has a density, the inequality will hold for suﬃciently small k and the
proposition follows.
S of a rw eh a v es t u d i e dt h ee ﬀect of a radial increase in risk on the measure of
miscoordination, κ.N o t et h a tt h i se ﬀect is independent on expectation of ε.T o
study its eﬀect on unemployment one must also study how it aﬀects φ.T h i s i s
summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Let the random variable y denote the distribution of worker productiv-
ities and random variable z be obtained from y by a non-degenerate radial increase
in risk, i.e. z satisﬁes (83) for some random non-degenerate variable ε with
E lnε<0. (102)
Furthermore, assume both random variables y and z have probability densities and
26the expectations E(lny),E (lnz).are ﬁnite. Then there exists k∗∗ > 0 such that for
all k<k ∗∗ radial increase in risk will lead to decrease in the equilibrium ﬁrm to
worker ratio φ.
Note that condition (102) will be satisﬁed for a mean-preserving radial increase
in risk.
Proof. Formula (84) applied to the pair of random variables z and y implies that
Ez < Ey.S i n c e
ω(k)=E(lnw|w>k ) (103)
is continuous in k for any random variable w with density and
ω(0) = E(lnw) (104)
is ﬁnite for w ∈ {y,z} there exists k∗∗ > 0 such that for all k<k ∗∗
E(lnz|z>k ) >E (lny|y>k ) (105)
and the Proposition follows from (79).










where we made explicit the dependence of expectation on distribution F.L e tG







) and EG(lny) >E F(lny) (109)
Thus, such a transformation increases our measures of heterogeneity, entry, and
unemployment. The general eﬀect of an increase in heterogeneity on unemploy-
ment is summarized in the next Proposition.
27Proposition 9 Let random variable y denote distribution of workers skills and
random variable z be obtained from y by a non-degenerate radial increase in risk,
i.e. z satisﬁes (83) for some random non-degenerate variable ε with
E lnε<0. (110)
Furthermore, assume both random variables y and z have probability densities and
the expectations E(1
y),E (lny),E (1
ε),E (lnε) are ﬁnite Then there exists k>0
such that for all k<k radial increase in risk will lead to increase in unemployment
Proof. L e tu sc h o o s ek∗,k ∗∗ from the proofs of Propositions 8 and 9 respectively,
set k =m i n ( k∗,k ∗∗). Then the Proposition follows from (79).
In particular, the Proposition implies that an average productivity preserv-
ing radial increase in heterogeneity of workers’ skills will lead to an increase in
unemployment for suﬃciently low entry costs.
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 9 there exists ε such that Eε >
1 but unemployment increases for suﬃciently small k. That is, it is possible for
increases in average productivity to increase equilibrium unemployment.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to provide an example. Consider lnε ∼ N(−1,2).T h e n
E lnε = −1 and Eε = e>1.Then the result follows from Proposition 9.
Thus, as in the binomial case considered above, circumstances exist when in-
creases in the average productivity of workers may increase the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate, despite the implied increase in vacancy entry, due to the increase
in the visit probabilities placed on highly productive workers and the consequent
reduction in the visit probabilities of less productive workers. However, at this
point, it is worthwhile to stress the eﬃciency of these equilibria.
4 Constrained Eﬃciency
In this Section we identify the allocations that are constrained eﬃcient, for
given M and N and compare them to the equilibrium matching found in Section
2.. First, notice that unconstrained eﬃciency requires that M most productive
workers should be matched to the ﬁrms. In particular, if M>N(φ>1) uncon-
strained eﬃciency requires zero unemployment rate. Such matching can be easily
28achieved if the ﬁrms are allowed to move sequentially. If ﬁrms move simultane-
ously, however, such an allocation is not feasible. We will employ the following
notion of constrained eﬃciency. Assume each ﬁrm send a request for a worker to
a clearing house. The clearing house send request to worker i with probability
πi. A worker who receives just one request accepts the job at zero wage, a worker
who receives more than one request accepts a job and bids her wage up to her
productivity, while the worker who gets no requests remain unemployed.
We assume that the clearing house cannot keep track of the workers who already
received requests. Therefore, the only control variables the clearing house has are
probabilities πi, which are selected to maximize the social surplus of the matches,









πi =1 ,πi ≥ 0
, (111)
where π =( π1,...,πN) is the vector of probabilities.
Deﬁnition 2 Matching probabilities are constrained eﬃcient if they solve problem
(111).












The Kunh-Tucker conditions are
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
M(1 − πi)M−1yi − λ + μi =0
N X
i=1
πi =1 ,π i ≥ 0,μ i ≥ 0
μiπi =0
. (113)
29To analyze system (113) notice that
∂2L
∂yi∂πi
= M(1 − πi)
M−1 > 0, (114)
therefore eﬃcient probabilities are increasing in productivities. Therefore, there
exists K ≤ N such that πi > 0 for i =1 ,...,K and πi =0for i>K .




λ = M(1 − πK)M−1yK
μi =0for i = 1,K
μi = M[(1 − πK)M−1yK − yi] > 0 for i = K +1 ,N
. (115)
Notice that the constraint eﬃcient probabilities coincide with the equilibrium
matching probabilities. That is, equilibrium matching is constrained eﬃcient.
This constrained eﬃciency result holds true even with ﬁnite numbers of agents,
due to the particular wage determination mechanism we use in this paper. It
remains true in the limiting large economy, and with entry.11
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section we take some of the implications of our theory directly to the










where q represents the per cent of employable workers, κ is the measure of hetero-
geneity, and φ is the vacancy-unemployment rate.
A simple test of the theory is to solve (61) for κ to obtain







and to compare each κt with one.
11These last two points are very standard in directed search models, and the proof is omitted
here. Details are available from the authors upon request.
30Alternatively, one can also estimate the model, treating κ as a parameter.
Assuming that κ is constant requires making some ad hoc assumptions on the
distribution; however, the exercise is still useful, since it allows us to construct a
conﬁdence interval for a weighted average value of κ and test formally that it is
greater than one. The exercise also proves useful for countries where the quality of
individual data is poor and individual observation of κt are to noisy for any useful
comparisons with theory to be made.
5.1 Treating κ as a Variable
The theory suggests that κ is a function of the distribution of worker produc-
tivity and costs of vacancy creation and potentially time varying. If we take the
l o n g - t e r mu n e m p l o y m e n tt ou n e m p l o y m e n tr a t i oa st h er a t i oo ft h eu n e m p l o y a b l e
workers in the economy it is possible to use equation (116) to generate the implied
value of κ given the observed data. Doing so gives us an idea of how κt varies over
time. We conduct this exercise for the US, using the available data from 2001Q1-
2007Q1. Our data comes from a variety of sources: Shimer (2007) uses the Current
Population Survey to extract an estimate for the rate at which workers transition
from unemployment to employment adjusted for time aggregation.12 The number
of vacancies is taken from the JOLTS data set and unemployment data is available
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Figure 1 illlustrates the series {κt} generated
from this exercise. Clearly, although there is signiﬁcant variation in κ over time
we ﬁnd that it exceeds a value of one in all periods, in accordance with the theory.
In principle, the standard errors of κ can be estimated from
dκt = hφdφt + hξdξt + hqdqt, (117)
where







and dφt,d ξ t,d q t are the measurement errors.
12This data was constructed by Robert Shimer. For additional details, please see Shimer (2007)
and his webpage http://home.uchicago.edu/ shimer/data/ﬂows/.
315.2 Treating κ as Parameter
W eb e g i nw i t ha ne x a m i n a t i o no ft h em a t c h i n gf u n c t i o ni nt h eU n i t e dS t a t e s .
The model in this paper is static, but when estimating a directed search matching
function it is necessary to take a stand on the length of a time period during
which ﬁrms can attract workers. For the purposes of our estimation, we set a
period equal to one month. That is, ﬁrms are allowed to approach one worker on
a monthly basis.13 Given the instantaneous rate of matching derived by Shimer
(2007), we are able to extract the probability that a worker forms a job match
within a particular month.
With our available data, we are able to estimate the parameters of our match-
ing function using non-linear least squares. There are two possible methods of
proceeding. First, we can take the ratio of long term unemployed as a proxy for
size of the unemployable population 1 − q, and allow this to vary over time, ac-
c o r d i n gt ot h ed a t a .14 Alternatively, we could treat q as another parameter. We
consider each approach in turn.
5.2.1 Treating q as a Variable
There are potentially two sources of error in this procedure. Some of the long-
term unemployed workers may actually be employable and some of the short-term
unemployed may be unemployable.15 The calibration of q seems a reasonable
activity to undertake for a couple of reasons. First, it may reduce the standard
errors associated with our variable of prime interest, κ. Second, our model does
not restrict q to be constant over time.
Thus, initially, we calibrate qt using unemployment by duration data. Then κ
13Selecting a shorter time period will lower the probability of ﬁnding a job within a period.
In the data, this lower probability of job ﬁnding is equivalent to an increase in frictions and will
tend to increase our estimates of κ providing stronger support for a model with heterogeneity
relative to a model with worker homogeneity. We do not see selecting a longer time period than
a month as reasonable. In particular, we expect ﬁrms to be able to send out applications at a
rate of at least one per month.
14For long-term unemployed we take workers who have been unemployed for six months or
longer. For European countries we take workers who have been unemployed for a year or longer
as a measure of unemployable. These diﬀerences reﬂect data constraints.
15It is diﬃcult to know how important these biases are. We do know that given the job ﬁnding
rates observed in the data, the probability that a worker with the average rate of job ﬁnding
remains unemployed after six months is about 10 per cent.


























where κt i st h et r u ev a l u eo ft i m es e r i e sκ at period t, given by (116). Our theory
predicts that b κ>1 The results are provided in Table 1 and conﬁrm that prediction.
This result is strongly statistically signiﬁcant and supportive of the presence of
worker heterogeneity:




5.2.2 Treating q as a Parameter
Here, we attempt to estimate both κ and q as parameters. That is, they are















However, if true value of q diﬀers from period to period this procedure will produce
is downward biased estimate for κ under reasonable assumptions. To see it, note















wt(b q)=( 1 − b κexp(−
φt
b q











b q − ξt
b q
= h(φt,ξt, b q). (124)
Note that if value of b κ is not too big then all weights wt(b q) are positive. Moreover,
for reasonable realizations of qt and φt
16 function h(φt,ξt,·) is convex. Therefore








where true value κt is deﬁned by equation (116). Therefore, the estimate for the
average value of κ is downward biased, which is likely to cause a downward bias
for b q. The estimation below, which produces value of b κ below one and signiﬁcantly
underestimates b q conﬁrms these observations.
Table 2: Estimation of κ and q
Parameter κq
Estimate 0.84106 0.32144
Std Error 0.06438 0.00794
16One needs 2qt >φ t
345.3 Cross-country Evidence
The above results outlines the evidence from the United States. It is possible
to examine other countries. Shimer (2007) and Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2008)
illustrate how to use data on unemployment duration to infer job ﬁnding proba-
bilities. We collect data on unemployment by duration and job vacancies for a set
of European countries from the Eurostat Database. This allows us to extract esti-
mates of the matching rate for the following European countries: Finland, Greece,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.17







United Kingdom 2.59312 (0.09025)
We examine the case where the ratio of short-term to total unemployment is
used as a measure of employability. The results are provided in Table 3 with
standard errors provided in brackets. Under this speciﬁcation the cross-country
data is relatively in suggesting that κ>1 with the exception of Portugal where
the implied value of κ is consistent with a directed search model of the labour
market, but without heterogeneity in worker productivity.
We repeat our previous analysis and estimate using the implied value of κ and
q for a broad range of countries. These results are displayed in Table 4. Here the
results are more mixed. For a set of countries the estimated value of κ remains
greater than one but for a Portugal and Greece, κ is estimated to be less than
one. A feature of this speciﬁcation is that the percentage of employable workers
in most speciﬁcations remains surprisingly small.
17Our choice of countries is generally restricted by the necessity of having vacancy data and
unemployment by duration data for a number of years. Spain was removed from the sample due
to the fact that the deﬁnition of a vacancy changes in mid-sample.
35Table 4: Cross-country evidence on κ and the Fraction of Employable Workers
Country κq
Finland 1.107046 (0.120810) 0.138962 (0.004186)
Greece 0.290263 (0.310822) 0.060405 (0.003556)
Netherlands 50.921362 (15.943657) 0.081429 (0.004255)
Portugal 0.71082 (0.10850) 0.08995 (0.01250)
Slovenia 1.218025 (0.444972) 0.073154 (0.009908)
United Kingdom 9.494712 (3.451678) 0.129374 (0.003291)
5.4 Directed Search versus Cobb-Douglas Matching Func-
tion
In much of the applied labour search literature, a reduced form Cobb-Douglas
matching function is often used. The advantages of this speciﬁcation is that it ﬁts
the data well but this comes at the expense of not having explicit microfounda-
tions. As noted by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), the standard directed search
matching function tends to perform poorly relative to the Cobb-Douglas matching
function. These matching functions are non-nested so it is diﬃcult to compare
to these models directly. Returning to the US data, Figure 2 presents how the
predicted values of the diﬀerent models compare to the actual data.
There are a couple of points of interest. First, the directed search model with
worker production heterogeneity performs signiﬁcantly better in matching the data
than a model without heterogeneity. However, relative to a Cobb-Douglas match-
ing function, the elasticity of the job ﬁnding rate with respect to the vacancy
unemployment rate is too large. To show this, Figure 3 illustrates the observed
response of the job ﬁnding rate to changes in the vacancy-unemployment rate and
the ﬁtted values implied by our diﬀerent models for the United States. The elas-
ticity of job ﬁnding in response to changes in the vacancy-unemployment rate is
too high in directed search models.
It is straightforward to take our implied matching functions and derive the











where   is the elasticity of the job ﬁnding rate with respect to φ with subscript DS,1
corresponding to the case of directed search with homogenous workers and DS,2
with heterogeneous workers. Note that when κ → 1 and q → 1 that  DS,2 →  DS,1.
Over our short sample the average vacancy-unemployment rate is just over 0.5
in the United States. From the data, the estimated elasticity of job ﬁnding with
respect to φ is 0.37. For the directed search model with homogenous workers,
the elasticity is 0.77when φ =0 .5. We can also think about how worker hetero-
geneity will aﬀect this elasticity. There are two eﬀects. First,introducing worker
heterogeneity may increase κ above one which tends to increase elasticity. This in
itself tends to increase the elasticity. Second, it generates unemployable workers
that may reduce q below one, which may reduce the elasticity. In our unrestricted
regression of κ and q we ﬁnd κ =0 .82 and q =0 .4. This combination of (κ,q)
implies from (6) an elasticity of 0.38 which matches the data well - but only by
having a value of κ<1.
6 Conclusions and Extensions
In this study we have explored the implications of worker heterogeneity on
matching and unemployment when ﬁr m sd i r e c tt h e i rs e a r c h . W eh a v eu s e dt h e
simplest model possible in the sense that the environment is static, heterogeneity
is one-dimensional, and ﬁrms are homogeneous. However, we have allowed for
considerable generality with regard to the distribution of worker productivities.
By doing so, we have identiﬁed conditions under which some proportion of the
workforce will not be approached in equilibrium. Plausibly, these workers, which
we call "unemployables" correspond, in the real world to long-term unemployed
workers. They are qualitatively diﬀerent from workers who will be approached
with positive probability, but are unlucky ex post, and, thus, simply unemployed.
In equilibrium, unemployment is a prospect facing workers of all levels of skill —
37but only those workers at the lower end of the distribution are unemployable, and
have no realistic hope of being employed.
We also found that a simple equilibrium matching function emerges in this
environment, which is a generalization of the matching function that comes out of
directed search models with homogeneity, but has two extra terms: the fraction of
unemployable workers and a statistic, κ, that measures the degree of heterogeneity
in the distribution. This allowed us to consider the eﬀects of this heterogeneity on
the equilibrium matching rate and unemployment, in a relatively straightforward
way. In particular, we found that, under certain conditions, an increasing the
productivity of high-skilled workers will increase the equilibrium unemployment
r a t e—d e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a ti te n c o u r a g e se n t r yb yﬁrms. Finally, we tested one of
the key predictions of the theory ( κ ≥ 1) and found support for this in the data.
Several immediate extensions come to mind, which we ﬁnd interesting. First,
in a dynamic version of this model, with aggregate shocks, one might expect that
the fraction of workers who are unemployable would vary over the cycle — and,
potentially, with more volatility than the fraction of workers who are simply not
lucky enough to ﬁnd work. Secondly, introducing ﬁrm heterogeneity alongside
worker heterogeneity seems worthy of study. Finally, allowing for investments on
either side of the market, and thus, potentially endogenous heterogeneity clearly
would be of interest.
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Directed Search Heterogeneity, k estimated
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